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Patent First, Litigate Later!
The Scramble for Speculative and Overly Broad
Genetic Patents: Implications for Access to
Health Care and Biomedical Research
Ikechi Mgbeoji † & Byron Allen‡

Introduction

process. Implicit in this assumption is that the bargain
would only be worthwhile if the disclosures made in the
patent specification are of such character or quality as
would confer a net value on the society, especially in
respect of new technologies, industries, or research. In
effect, beneath the apparent legalese of the patent system
is a policy of encouraging disclosure of valuable information, enrichment of the public domain, and concomitant
welfare of both the inventor and the larger society.
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O

ne of the theoretical premises of the patent system
is that it enhances the dissemination of valuable
information by assuring creators of new inventions a
limited monopoly for the exploitation of their inventions. As a tool of state policy, the patent system seeks to
catalyze the industrialization of the state, disclosure of
information by inventors, and ultimately, the enrichment of the public domain in a manner that benefits
both the inventor and the society. Consequently, the
patent system is often characterized as a form of contract
between the inventor and the state. 1 As a consideration
for disclosing the secret of the invention, so this theory
says, the state grants the inventor limited monopoly over
the use of the invention. The implicit assumption in this
simplified theoretical construction of a complex system
is that the inventor and the society benefits mutually
from the bargain.
Although this theory, indeed romantic idealization
of the patent system, has been assailed on several fronts
by a formidable school of critical scholars 2 of the patent
system, 3 it nonetheless constitutes the major rhetorical
flag which advocates or supporters of the patent system
readily wave before skeptics as the raison d’etre of the
patent system. 4 Without revisiting the merits or otherwise of this unresolved debate, the central and undisputed tenet of patent laws is that the exclusive rights
granted by the patent are delimited and defined by the
specification supporting the patent application. It is the
utility embedded in the patent specification which acts
as a consideration for the enormous limited monopoly
conferred on the inventor and which the state is often
willing to lend its authority and processes to protect and
enforce.
In theory thus, patent holders may lawfully use this
market exclusivity and assurance of state protection to
generate profits and recoup the costs of the inventive

In recent times, however, developments resulting
from the internationalization of the United States’ patent
law have encouraged biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical companies to argue in favour of stringent patent
laws and broad patent claims. 5 In the same context, there
is a growing concern among patent lawyers and policymakers that the major patent offices of the world are
relatively lax and permissive in issuing patents on
biotechnological products without demonstrable utility.
There is an emerging consensus among scholars of the
patent system that mechanical inventions receive a
tougher scrutiny for utility than their genetic or
biotechnological counterparts. The convergence of these
strong undercurrents poses severe challenges to the
social utility of patent regimes and the fairness of the
patent system as a whole. Given that the normative basis
or theoretical justification of the patent system is that
patents are a contract between the inventor and the
public for the disclosure of valuable information to the
public and protection of the inventor’s investments, a
patent of uncertain utility is a fraud on the public. If the
patent system performs its role, other inventors or
researchers would be able to build upon valuable information to produce better products for the benefit of
society. Genetic patents in particular are thus intended
to provide access to innovations in health care and
genetic research. Consequently, where patents are issued
on genetic materials without demonstrable utility the
society is short-changed, the public domain is cluttered
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with speculative patents, and the patent system becomes
a clog rather than a catalyst for social welfare. 6 It is
arguable that the contemporary trend in issuance of patents to genetic materials when such materials are not
accompanied with sufficient disclosure of their utility
encourages speculative patenting and eventually turns
the patent system into rubbish.
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In addition, the granting of speculative genetic patents which fail the requirement of the rules on specification of inventions 7 grossly distorts the evidential which is
at the base of the integrity and efficiency of the patent
system, particularly in patent validity litigations. This is
the position notwithstanding the fact that section 53(1)
of the Canadian Patent Act, 8 and similar provisions in
other patent legislations across the world, provide that a
patent is void ‘‘if the specification and drawing contains
more or less than is necessary for obtaining the end for
which they purport to be made and the omission or
addition is willfully made for the purpose of misleading’’. 9 In Canada, as in other patent law jurisdictions,
the power to void or invalidate a patent rests with the
Federal Court (or similar courts) and not with the individual member of the public who may believe that a
particular genetic patent is of dubious validity.
Apart from the fact that courts are the ultimate
determinants of the validity or otherwise of a patent
issued by the pertinent patent office, it has to be emphasized that there is a statutory presumption of validity,
albeit weakly worded, in favour of patents already issued
by a patent office. In other words, no matter the reservations any person may have about a particular patent,
such a patent is presumed valid until the courts say
otherwise. According to s. 43(2) of the Canadian Patent
Act,
[A]fter the patent is issued, it shall in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, be valid and avail the patentee and
the legal representatives of the patentee for the term mentioned in section 44 or 45, whichever is applicable. 10

However, in Canada, opinion is divided as to
whether the presumption in question is an evidential
burden to be discharged by the defendant in a patent
validity trial or an incidental burden of introducing preliminary evidence. 11 According to Dube J., ‘‘the burden is
on the defendant challenging a patent to show, on the
usual standard of the balance of probabilities, that a
patent is invalid. The burden is heavy and is not easy to
overcome’’. 12 On the other hand, Pratte J. observed
rather ambiguously in Rubbermaid (Canada) Ltd. v.
Tucker Plastic Products Ltd that:
[O]nce the party attacking the patent has introduced the
evidence, the Court, in considering evidence and in determining whether it establishes the invalidity of the patent
must not take presumption into account. It cannot be said
that the presumption created by [now 45] is, as a rule, either
easy or difficult to overcome; in some cases, the circumstances may be such that the presumption will be easily
rebutted, while in other cases the same result may be very
difficult or even impossible to obtain. 13

Interestingly, when this issue came up before the
Canadian Supreme Court, the Court opined that ‘‘the
presumption adds little to the onus already existing, in
the usual way, on the attacking party’’. 14 In effect, the
preponderant judicial tenor in Canada is in favour of a
presumption of validity of patents. What is more disturbing is the impression created by the courts across the
world that a challenge to the validity of a patent is often
the desperate argument of an infringer. In this context,
the need for patent examiners to be very rigorous when
evaluating the completeness of an application for patents, particularly in respect of genetic matter, can hardly
be overemphasized. Members of the public rely on
patent examiners to exercise their best possible judgment in the issuance of patents, especially genetic patents. Consequently, where patent offices are slack or lax
in their responsibility to ensure that genetic patent applications satisfy the requirements of sufficient disclosure
and utility, the patents issued unfairly place the burden
on the person attacking the validity of the patent. In the
light of these developments, the question arises as to
what policies ought to be put in place to deal with the
emergent trend of speculative genetic patents as they
impact on the integrity of the patent system and on
health care and research.
Increasing concerns over the legal validity of genetic
patents and licensing of genes and genetic material transcend theoretical or scholarly discomfort with tardy
application of patent law by patent examiners. Genetic
testing and research has in modern times become
increasingly critical to health care delivery. The broad
interpretation that has been granted to gene patents and
the creeping culture of patent now and litigate later,
particularly in Canada and the U.S., has led to what
many commentators feel is the emergence of a predatory
patent regime. As restrictive licensing practices combine
with heated races to the patent office by researchers, the
immediate consequences include the monopolization of
clinical testing, uncertainty of the scope of patents, excessive commercialization of research, 15 and distortion of
the academic research agenda.
On both the legal and policy levels, the emergent
trend threatens the integrity and essence of the patent
regime. It is a fundamental policy of patent regimes that
patentees, competitors, and the public are entitled to
definite functions of a patent specification. Given that
specification lies at the ‘‘heart of the patent system’’, 16
there is a compelling need to rethink the excessively
liberal construction of patent specifications and the
laxity of the patent offices, particularly in respect of
genetic matter. Unless the patent system is made to perform its vaunted function of enriching the public
domain in exchange for limited monopolies, the public
would suffer from a ‘‘bargain process’’ heavily weighted
in favour of questionable patented genetic materials. As
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the Canadian Supreme Court warned in Apotex Inc. v.
Wellcome Foundation Ltd:
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[I]t is not enough for a patent owner to be able to buttress
speculation with post-patent proof, and thereby turn dross
into gold. Utility is an essential part of the definition of an
invention. A policy of patent first and litigate later unfairly
puts the onus of proof on the attackers to prove invalidity,
without the patent owner’s ever being put in a position to
establish validity. Unless the inventor is in a position to
establish utility as of the time the patent is applied for, on
the basis of either demonstration or sound prediction, the
Commissioner ‘‘by law’’ is required to refuse the patent. 17

This paper will not directly address the ethical considerations of allowing patents on human genetic
sequences, although this continues to be a controversial
debate in itself. 18 Rather, the aim is to consider the
legality of such gene patents and the effects such patents
have on biomedical research and health care delivery in
definitive terms through an analysis of current developments and research relating to the subject. The operation
of current intellectual property regimes regulating such
patents will be examined, and amendments to these
legal systems will be considered. An emphasis will be
placed on identifying practical concerns rather than
broad, general issues that do not directly address practical implications. In concluding our analysis, we propose
a set of policy options which the patent system and
public institutions may pursue to mitigate the excesses of
an exuberant and liberal patent system.
In the light of the recent sequencing of the human
genome, and the concurrent genomic mapping of several other important organisms essential as research
models in bioscience research, this topic is of considerable importance. As gene sequences and complementary
protein structures are increasingly characterized in
humans and other related organisms, the elucidation of
basic molecular pathways and disease-related mechanisms will result in an exponential increase in
biomedical and biotechnological innovations. The fundamental nature of health care will change as common
diseases and genetic predispositions will be characterized
and treated on a molecular level. It is therefore essential
that the processes by which these innovations are developed and shared benefit both society and innovators to
the greatest possible extent in a manner that is consistent
with the tenets and policy anchors of patent law.
This paper is divided into five parts, of which part
one is introductory. Part two examines the law on patentability of genetic sequences. It argues that in recent
decades, patent law across the globe has been gradually
diluted to accommodate the huge capital investment in
biomedical research. The relaxation of the standards of
patentability has in turn led to the proliferation of
biomedical patents. Part three takes the analysis further
by examining the impact of this trend on biomedical
research, the public domain, and access to health care. In
part four, we propose a set of solutions to the problems
identified and analyzed earlier. The paper concludes its
analysis in part five.

Patentability of Genetic Sequences

A

rguably, the patent system was not originally
designed for protection of life forms. 19 Rather, early
patent systems, especially in the United Kingdom, continental Western Europe, and North America were dominated almost exclusively by machines and mechanical
devices. 20 Discoveries, principles of nature, and natural
products were all debarred from the range of patentable
subject-matter. 21 However, as early industrialization
evolved from machines and extended to chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, and lately, biotechnology, the patent
regime expanded its scope of patentable subject-matter
to accommodate the claims of those emergent industries. 22
Although the nature of this (r)evolution in the
patent system is outside the scope of this paper, it suffices
to note at this stage that the expansion of the patent
system to accommodate growths in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biological fields often emanated from
judicial interpretation of patentable subject-matter rather
than express legislative adjustments. 23 Thus, the exposition of what constitutes patentable subject-matter has
largely remained a judicial creation rather than a legislative function. Attempts to limit the scope of patentable
subject-matter to the express letters of the law have often
come to a miserable end as courts often embrace interpretative techniques which yield modern meanings to
what constitutes acceptable patentable subject-matter.
Hence, there is merit in the observation of the
Canadian Patent Appeal Board in Re Application of Abitibi that ‘‘throughout the world various judicial bodies,
without changes in legislation, have gradually altered
their interpretation of statutory subject-matter to adapt it
to new developments on technologies, and current concepts of industrial activity’’. 24 It was largely within this
paradigm that the courts have, over the years, resolved
many fundamental issues in patent law in favour of new
industries. In modern times, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries have been the greatest beneficiaries
of the inherent capacity of patent systems to embrace
modern conceptions of patentable subject-matter. 25
The predilection of the patent system to adjust to
new conceptions of patentability is often reflected in the
epochal deployments of capital in the society. In the past
five or six decades, this phenomenon is probably best
exemplified in the fine distinctions which the courts
have gradually imposed on the patentability of purified
products of nature on one hand and products of nature
per se on the other hand. 26 Originally, patent systems
across the world purported to debar the patentability of
products of nature. However, with the rise of sophisticated methods of pharmaceutical research and manufacture, the major patent systems of the world have drawn a
distinction between products of nature per se and
refined products of nature. While the latter is patentable, 27 the former is not.
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Interestingly, the patenting of refined or purified
products of nature started with the patent on acetyl salicylic (aspirin) in 1910. 28 Thus, on the basis of the hypothesis that purified or refined natural substances are physically and chemically distinct from raw products of
nature, 29 the courts in the United States of America and
elsewhere have upheld the patenting of purified natural
substances such as vitamin B12, 30 purified prostaglandins, 31 adrenalin, 32 et cetera. 33 Intriguingly, the
argument that purified natural products are patentable
was made in respect of purified tungsten 34 (in the case of
General Electric Co. v. Deforest Radio Co. 35) but the
Court rejected it. It is on the theory that genetic materials are akin to chemical compounds that patents are
increasingly issued to such genetic matter.
Given the current trend in patenting genetic matter,
there remains a question on whether such materials are
legally patentable. 36 It is not enough that a particular
substance sought to be patented is a chemical, it must
also have a demonstrable utility. Generally speaking,
genes or genetic sequences as they exist in vivo, or as
they exist in nature, are not per se patentable. However,
on the basis that gene fragments are chemicals, patent
protection is available for isolated and purified DNA
fragments, full length genes, and the protein products of
genes, provided their functions are known. In effect,
modern patent law treats DNA material similarly to patentable chemical compounds that have been derived
from natural resources, provided, of course, the function
of such chemicals, albeit of biochemical origins, are
known and specifically identified. 37
By law, in order to receive a patent for a genetic
sequence, the patent application must satisfy the requirements of novelty and utility under s. 2 of the Canadian
Patent Act, and the non-obviousness requirement under
s. 28.3. 38 The Canadian Intellectual Property Office position that genetic sequences may qualify as patentable
subject matter was recently reinforced by the Canadian
Federal Court of Appeal in a decision granting Harvard
University a patent for claims on a transgenic mouse. 39
Justice Rothstein, speaking for the majority, stated that
‘‘DNA is a physical substance and is therefore matter’’. 40
Although the decision was ultimately overturned by the
Supreme Court of Canada, which held that higher life
forms are not patentable subject matter under the definition of ‘‘invention’’ in s. 2 of the Act, the holding did not
affect the current understanding that genetic sequences
with known functions or utility are patentable subject
matter under the Canadian Patent Act. 41
However, what is troubling about some patented
gene sequences is that unlike other chemicals with
known utility, the functions of certain genetic materials
are often unknown even when scientists know the function of a similar gene sequence. Yet, some patent offices
have been issuing genetic patents on the basis of
homology rather than specific and ascertained utility or
function. This practice is inconsistent with patent law. As
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the United States’ National Institutes of Health (NIH)
and the Association of American Medical Colleges
(AAMC) have recently argued, patents on homologous
gene sequences (as they are called) are flawed because ‘‘a
difference in a single base pair in a gene sequence can
have important functional implications’’. 42
Granting patents on gene sequences with unknown
functions, even when the function of a gene homologue
is known, is speculative and presumptuous. In effect,
such a patent becomes a fishing or hunting licence, an
instrument of speculation, rather than performing its
avowed role as a facilitator of disclosure of specific and
useful information by inventors to the public. 43 Simply
put, the patenting of gene fragments of unknown utility
flies in the face of basic patent law and short-changes the
public. The impact of such speculative and uncertain
patents on the larger society is decidedly negative. As
Binnie J. warned in respect of patents with indeterminate and unknown functions:
[T]he patent system is designed to advance research and
development and to encourage broader economic activity.
Achievement of these objectives is undermined however if
competitors fear to tread in the vicinity of the patent
because its scope lacks a reasonable measure of precision
and certainty. A patent of uncertain scope becomes a public
nuisance. Potential competitors are deterred from working
in areas that are not in fact covered by the patent even
though costly and protracted litigation (which in the case of
patent disputes can be very costly and protracted indeed)
might confirm that what the competitors propose to do is
entirely lawful. Potential investment is lost or otherwise
directed. Competition is ‘chilled’. The patent owner is getting more of a monopoly than the public bargained for. 44

In addition to patents on full gene sequences, patents have been granted in Canada and the U.S. for
expressed sequence tags (ESTs), complementary DNA
(cDNA), and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). 45
ESTs are short fragments of larger genes that have a
variety of uses in molecular biology, including the identification of complementary full length genes and similar,
homologous gene sequences within and among species.
cDNA is a widely used research tool for methods such as
genome mapping. SNPs constitute single nucleotide variations within genes between and among organisms.
Single nucleotide variation within a gene can result in
disease development and is implicated in certain cancer
development and genetic predispositions to disease.
SNPs are used frequently to locate chromosome markers
to identify genes implicated in disease.
Of late, however, the position in the United States 46
and Germany 47 is that the patent offices will henceforth
apply a stricter regime on patentability of gene
sequences. This welcome return to a more rigorous standard of patentability is largely born out of the concern
that, apart from their apparent illegality, broad gene patents hinder the exploitation of newly discovered functions for DNA sequences. In addition, there is a growing
apprehension that broad gene patents stifle research in
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the biomedical and pharmaceutical fields. 48 These concerns deserve a closer analysis.

Effects of Broad Genetic Patents on
Health Care and Biomedical
Research
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here is an increasing number of patents being
issued in the U.S., Canada, and abroad covering
patents implicated in human disease, and diagnostic tests
developed for these diseases are being commercialized
by biotech companies. Many laboratories have avoided
offering such diagnostic tests and developing further
research on these genes because of concerns of patent
infringement. This has also raised concerns by numerous
groups that such restrictions will inevitably inhibit further research into disease-related mechanisms of gene
function. There is thus a compelling need to strike the
appropriate balance between public and commercial
interests. 49
Emerging evidence shows that public and private
laboratories may be restricted from offering certain diagnostic tests for disease and genetic predisposition due to
costly licence and royalty fees. This is of particular importance to national health care systems. Canada’s social
policy towards health care subsidizes a significant proportion of health care treatment. The Canadian heath
care system is in a financial crisis, and providing access to
innovative medical treatments and diagnostics in some
instances has proven extremely costly. 50
In 2002, the Ontario provincial government refused
to recognize patents held by a U.S.-based biotechnology
firm, Myriad Genetics. 51 Myriad Genetics holds nine U.S.
patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2, genes involved in breast
and ovarian cancer susceptibility, and similar patents
have been granted in Canada and Japan and filed in the
United Kingdom and Europe. The test costs approximately $1,150 in Ontario in Canadian dollars. Myriad
notified the provincial government of the firm’s patent
rights and mandated that the province send samples to
Myriad laboratories for testing, costing approximately
$3,850 in U.S. dollars for each test. 52
The British Columbia government has ceased diagnostic testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, and has suspended funding for the test across Canada. Quebec has
agreed to send samples to Myriad laboratories, and
Alberta has continued to provide testing. The remaining
provinces are not offering the diagnostic test. The significance of Myriad’s refusal to license the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 tests cannot be underemphasized given the prevalence of breast and ovarian cancer among women. 53
Early diagnosis and knowledge of genetic predisposition
considerably increases treatment effectiveness. These reasons may have compelled research institutions in Germany, the Netherlands, and France to challenge Myriad’s
BRCA patent applications. 54

The implications of overly broad gene patents on
health care across the globe are gradually moving from
the periphery to the core of rising concerns on the future
of public access to health care. A recent study researched
the adoption and use by U.S. laboratories of genetic
testing for a common hereditary disorder. 55 The results
found that 30 percent of the laboratories surveyed ceased
to provide or develop the test as a result of an exclusive
licence granted on the patents for clinical testing services. 56 A similar study was conducted to research the
licensing activities of private firms holding patents on
genetic diagnostic tests. 57 The results found the patents
included in the study that had been licensed were
entirely under exclusive terms. 58 These results and other
published data 59 on genetic patents involving disease
illustrate a trend toward a monopolization of diagnostic,
therapeutic, and research purposes concerning a particular gene. Access to genetic-based diagnostics and therapies will become increasingly important as biomedical
research and development provides an entirely novel
approach to disease treatment. Beyond issues of access to
health care, it is becoming obvious that, rather than promote research and inventiveness as most proponents of
the patent system assert is its raison d’être, broad gene
patents issued on genetic sequences of doubtful or
unknown utility stifle and hamper research.
Some studies have shown that patents on genetic
material have affected researchers’ willingness to explore
new areas of research and reduced the level of communication within the scientific community. 60 In a survey of
approximately 2,100 life science researchers, 19.8 per
cent of the respondents reported delaying publications
of research results for greater than six months in order to
prepare and file patent applications, to provide time for
patent prosecution, to protect their intellectual property
rights, or to resolve contentious intellectual property
ownership issues. The study also found that research
teams actively pursuing commercialization of university
research and partnered with private firms were correlated with significant publication delays. Variables associated with the practice of refusing to share results
included human genetic research and involvement in
university research commercialization. The researchers
concluded that withholding results was not a common
practice among life science researchers, but was much
more prevalent among faculty research groups pursuing
university technology transfer opportunities and corporate partnerships. What makes the situation even more
outrageous is that a large number of the patented gene
sequences were obtained at a time when patents were
granted on gene sequences without identified functions.
As Bruce Alberts and Sir Aaron Klug have rightly pointed
out:
[T]he intention of some university and commercial interests
to patent the DNA sequences themselves, thereby staking
claim to large numbers of human genes without necessarily
having a full understanding of their functioning, strikes us as
contrary to the essence of patent law. 61
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Apart from bringing the patent system to disrepute,
the emergent practice flies in the face of common
notions that patents constitute a form of fair bargain and
contract between the inventor and the society. The
reality with such gene patents is that they often shortchange the society by granting the inventor large and
expansive rights over ‘‘areas’’ or ‘‘spaces’’ which have
indeterminable boundaries and thus unfairly constrict
the ability of members of the public in conducting
research in such ‘‘areas’’ or ‘‘spaces’’. As Bruce Alberts and
Sir Aaron Klug again observe:
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[T]hose who would patent DNA sequences without real
knowledge of their utility are staking claims not only to
what little they know at present, but also to everything that
might later be discovered about the genes and proteins
associated with the sequence. They are, in effect, laying
claim to a function that is not yet known or a use that does
not yet exist. This may be in current shareholders’ interests.
But it does not serve society well. 62

Given that scientists are still at the very early stages
of understanding the human genetic sequence, it is vital
that researchers have access to the full genome without
the encumbrances of overly broad genetic patents. 63 The
effects of patenting genetic material also affect research
agendas within universities, especially in Canada and the
U.S. This relates to the growing relationships between
private industry and university research, especially in the
areas of biotechnology and biomedical research. However, a full treatment of the complex issues arising out of
corporate-university relations is beyond the scope of this
paper. 64
There are also issues of inefficiency in resource allocation raised by overly broad genetic patents. Thus, some
commentators have analyzed the current trend in
genetic patent grants in terms of resource allocation and
control. 65 During the second half of the 20th century the
original ‘‘commons model’’ of biomedical research, in
both Canada and the U.S., has developed into the current ‘‘privatization model’’. 66 Under the commons
model a significant amount of upstream biomedical
research was developed from public research institutions
and universities and results were circulated widely
within the scientific community. 67 Most research and
development was published and remained in the public
domain, and commercial downstream products
arrived. 68
The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a move
towards private sector research and development, and
with this trend arose the importance of protecting intellectual property with patents. A necessary consequence
of privatization was a large influx of capital from the
private sector, and a concurrent decline in public
funding. A similar trend has occurred within university
departments, as private funding of university research
projects and growing university-corporate ventures have
changed the fundamental nature of university research.
As private control of biomedical research and development continues, a rapid increase in patents on upstream

genetic patents, including patents on ESTs and partially
characterized gene sequences, may be hindering the
development of downstream research products.
Upstream intellectual property rights delay the development of effective treatment methods involving that specific gene, and may further interfere with research
involving related pathways that involve the patented
subject matter. 69
In practical terms, the exclusive rights granted by
patents restrict use of patented subject matter and
increase transaction costs necessary to access such information. Biomedical research necessarily requires access
to a number of resources, and patent protection may
often become an obstacle to access. The effective result is
an under use of restricted resources because of expansive,
if not dubious patents. In biomedical research the effects
can be demonstrated through the proliferation of overlapping patent claims and licences. Patents covering
characterized, full length genes may provide viable commercial products, including diagnostic genetic tests and
therapeutic treatments including pharmaceuticals.
However, both the Canadian Intellectual Property
Office (CIPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have issued patents on ESTs. The
corresponding gene, protein product, and biological role
of gene fragments are not fully characterized, and generally only putative functions are proposed on the basis of
homology-based comparisons with conserved gene families. As shown earlier, slight differences in gene
homology may produce radically different results. Preliminary sequence information is invaluable in preliminary research initiatives, but granting exclusive intellectual property rights over isolated gene fragments does
not afford valuable commercial products and research
benefits to the scientific community. The research and
development necessary to produce biomedical diagnostic genetic tests and therapeutic treatments requires
the use of multiple gene fragments. Access to gene
sequences requires significant transaction costs under an
intellectual property regime in which patents are granted
on multiple gene fragments. 70
The development of novel therapeutic agents by
private firms requires a process of receptor screening. An
established practice in the pharmaceutical industry is the
screening of large numbers of drug candidates in order
to assess possible effects on cellular function. Similarly,
candidates that are selected for further pre-clinical
research are screened with classes of receptor families to
assess therapeutic effects. Use of patented receptors
requires obtaining an extensive group of licensing agreements to avoid patent infringement suits, and private
firms cannot qualify under research exemptions in developing commercial products. Consequently, pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms normally pursue research
involving fewer patent licensing restrictions or proceed
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further into clinical testing without adequate in vitro
studies. 71
A further implication of granting patents over concurrent gene fragments involves licensing agreements
and research ventures entered into during the period
between the filing of a patent application and the patent
issuance. The rapid development of industry research
necessitates that firms and universities enter into
licensing agreements and develop research strategies
based on pending patent applications. Research groups
establishing research and development protocols are
restricted further by possible patent claims covered by
pending applications.
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Further, patent licensing of upstream genetic
sequences may result in numerous overlapping rights in
downstream commercial products. License agreements
may contain conditions granting the licensee royalties in
future commercial products developed by licensors,
reciprocal licences on commercial developments, or
options to acquire reciprocal licences. 72 Practical conflicts
can arise when overlapping claims to downstream products are created. In effect, upstream genetic patent
holders may acquire rights to subject matter outside of
the original patent claims, and exert control over downstream research and product development.
Patents over gene sequences may prevent other
researchers from collaborating and contributing to
proteomics research, the characterization of protein
structure and function. The field of proteomics will
eventually replace genomics as the major field of
biomedical research, and will provide a novel array of
protein-based platform technologies and products. Patents conferring intellectual property rights on proteinbased therapeutics will have significant implications for
health care treatment and delivery. 73
Again, overly broad gene patents have the potential
of skewing research agendas. A critical underlying principle in the enforcement of intellectual property regimes
regarding genetic sequences is the significant potential
for economic gain. A significant portion of biomedical
research is private, and the primary impetus for continued private research and innovation is capital earnings. As a result, research efforts are primarily directed at
projects designed to develop and market commercial
products. Such commercially-oriented research does not
generally produce the innovative impact within the scientific community as research designed at characterizing
basic biochemical and genetic processes. In addition, the
exclusive monopoly granted by genetic patents delays
general research into further study of biochemical and
genetic mechanisms. Basic molecular research that is not
predicated on producing commercial products will likely
provide a more distinct scientific understanding of biochemical pathways and significant contributions to
advances in biomedical research. 74
Universities have historically provided significant
contributions to basic research initiatives. Recently, a

number of universities have entered into corporate relationships and developed university technology transfer
initiatives. 75 As public research funding continues to
diminish and universities continue to pursue commercial research agendas, fundamental biochemical research
will be limited. Commercially-oriented research will not
provide broad-based contributions to science, and likewise innovations with maximum benefit to society will
be limited. 76 These wide implications of speculative and
overly broad genetic patents compel a need to rethink
contemporary practices and laws surrounding the issuance of genetic patents.

Proposed Solutions to the Problems
Associated With Speculative Genetic
Patents

T

he Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee
(CBAC) 77 and the Government of Ontario have
recently issued reports concerning genetic patents containing a number of recommended amendments to
existing Canadian patent law. 78 These responses take the
form of changes to patent office practice, judicial treatment and application of the law, and new legislation or
regulatory schemes introduced by Parliament. Although
some groups have called for a complete restriction on
patenting of any genetic material, this alternative is
impractical and may not be necessary. As noted by a
group of well-known commentators in this area, ‘‘. . . a
radical alteration in patent law . . . is unlikely to be tenable, because there are too many forces pushing the
patent agenda forward’’. 79 In the next pages, we outline
considerations of several proposed and critical amendments to current intellectual property regimes. We also
examine the proposed regulatory framework for genetic
patents.

Stringent Utility Requirements
Amendments should be made to promote further
innovation in downstream research development by
restricting the patenting of certain upstream gene
sequences. Patents granting exclusive rights on genetic
material that has not been fully characterized inhibits, or
at the very least, delays further research concerning a
gene and its related biological mechanisms. Restricting
patents on partially characterized sequences and gene
fragments diminishes overlapping claims and provides a
clear scope for patent rights. This aim could be achieved
by mandating that patent offices issue patents only in
cases where the gene sequence has been sufficiently characterized and a substantial utility has been clearly identified. 80 It is common knowledge that the patent offices
would not issue patents to mechanical inventions of
dubious or uncertain utility. There is no reason why a
comparative attitude or stance should not be adopted in
respect of genetic patents.
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90
The USPTO has recently issued utility examination
guidelines with respect to biotechnology patent applications. 81 These guidelines call for stricter application of
the utility requirement. The guidelines mandate that a
patent applicant provide in the patent claims and supporting written description a ‘‘specific and substantial
utility’’ that would be considered credible by a person of
ordinary skill in the art. 82 The credibility is assessed from
the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art
provided with the patent application and any relevant
evidence on record, including experimental data, expert
opinions, and previous scientific literature. 83 Only one
credible ‘‘specific and substantial utility’’ is required for a
patent application. As a result of these guidelines, a
patent application for a gene sequence that has a claimed
utility in hybridization techniques for identifying a particular gene marker must be able to identify a specific
gene loci. 84 The USPTO guidelines may also further
require that the gene probe be related to specific disease
research or a specific application. 85 For example, a gene
probe may be required to identify a specific diseaserelated gene mutation. The specific and substantial
utility requirement is intended to prevent ‘‘throwaway’’,
‘‘insubstantial’’, or ‘‘non-specific’’ uses from fulfilling the
utility requirement under § 101 of the U.S. Patent Act. 86
If the ‘‘specific and substantial utility’’ requirement
is not met, examiners are instructed to reject the application under § 101 for lack of utility and under § 112 for
failure to fully disclose the invention in the specifications
due to a lack of a specific and substantial utility. A patent
rejection based on § 101 and § 112 places the burden
on the applicant to provide further evidence to ‘‘establish
a probative relation between the submitted evidence
and the originally disclosed properties of the claimed
invention’’. 87 In circumstances where the examiner has
concluded the applicant has not provided a specific and
substantial utility, a prima facie showing must establish
that it is more likely than not that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would not consider that any utility
asserted by the applicant would be specific and substantial. 88 This prima facie showing must include a full explanation of reasoning supported by factual findings, and an
assessment of relevant evidence on record, including any
utilities from previous relevant art.
The guidelines also stipulate that statements of fact
made by applicants in relation to utilities asserted in the
claim must be considered true statements unless evidence to the contrary exists that would provide a legitimate basis for a person of ordinary skill in the art to
doubt the validity of such factual statements. Examiners
must also accept qualified expert opinion based on relevant facts unless there is a basis to question the accuracy
of such expert opinion. Several commentators submit
that the scope of a genetic patent claim should be
restricted to those uses that are disclosed in the patent
application and satisfy the utility requirement. This suggestion accords with the law in respect of patents on
mechanical inventions and ought to be applied with
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equal rigor to genetic patents. Under present patent law
an application that satisfies the utility requirement for a
genetic patent restricts all other parties from using the
genetic material in any method. The monopoly granted
thereby restricts further research in areas of biomedicine
and biotechnology that involve the subject matter of the
patent.
This argument has been refuted by noting that a
new use for that genetic material may qualify for a separate patent application, regardless of the fact that the
gene itself has been patented in a previous application.
Inasmuch as this accords with the law, 89 this reasoning
ignores the reality that new uses for genetic material
invariably require research using the patented material.
University and public research institutions may qualify
under an experimental use exemption to conduct
research on patented genetic material. If a new use is
discovered, normally a patent application will be filed on
the basis of this new use. Commercial marketing of the
patent will likely be pursued as a means for recovering
research expenditures and funding further research. 90 In
such circumstances, the original patent holder likely has
a basis for a patent infringement suit, as research exemptions are generally limited to bona fide research uses that
are not designed for profit taking.
For private research groups, no such protection is
possible. Research into new uses for gene sequences in
biotechnology, and particularly medical research, cannot
viably be pursued without infringing exclusive patent
rights. This may have dramatic consequences in delaying
advances in health care that are based on genetic
research, as patent holders effectively control not only
the marketing of a specific genetic patent, but can restrict
further research within entire fields of study for patented
gene sequences that are involved in numerous other
biochemical and disease-related pathways.
This argument is further supported when considering that a patent on a specific genetic sequence essentially grants a twenty-year monopoly to a patent holder
on further uses that may not have been contemplated by
the applicant at the time of the original application.
While a patent holder is granted exclusive rights to
research a particular gene sequence, any further substantial uses that arise from additional research may be
monopolized by a firm or group of firms holding exclusive licences. Although this seems readily justified, it
must be considered that other research groups are effectively prevented from furthering scientific progress
within exclusive patent protected areas of research. It is
not unlike the effects of granting a limited monopoly on
a mere scientific principle, and allowing limited firms
access to research and patent innovations based on that
basic principle. DNA sequences form the foundation of
all biochemical processes. DNA and RNA constitute the
underlying framework for protein production, enzyme
and hormone regulation, and basic cellular processes.
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Granting somewhat exclusive rights to such principal
subject matter carries significant consequences. 91
Concern has also been expressed over the use of
computer analysis of genetic sequence data based upon
homology, or sequence similarity, to previously discovered gene sequences and patent utility submissions
based on such data. Gene homology comparison is a
regularly used tool in studying gene and protein function. The sequence of a gene or gene fragment, or the
protein product sequence of the gene, can be compared,
using online research tools, with all other previously
sequenced and characterized gene families to determine
sequence homology. Preliminary gene functional assignments are made based on substantial homology with
conserved families of genes that share biological functions. There is credible scientific concern that sequence
homology analysis is unreliable and should not form the
basis of an alleged assignment of gene function. Even in
circumstances where such analysis provides a reasonable
general function, commentators have argued such putative assignment does not assess the actual biological role
of the gene sequence and protein product and therefore
patent examiners should not consider such evidence in
determining utility requirements. An additional submission is that if such homology-based utility analysis is
employed, the genetic sequence should be considered
obvious with respect to prior art.
The claim that an alleged utility based on homology
data would render a genetic patent application obvious
with respect to previous art can be dismissed by noting
that assessing the non-obviousness requirement is a completely separate determination from analyzing the utility
requirement. The basis for the rejection of a patent application must include reasoned determinations based on
the facts, with reliance on scientific data and evidence.
Structure and function assignment derived from
sequence homology data is a widely used research tool
that is grounded in plausible scientific principles. Examiners must consider such data in assessing the utility
requirement in a patent application. Such evidence is not
conclusive in satisfying utility requirements and should
be provided in conjunction with other evidence by the
applicant.
Without sufficient evidence to rebut homologybased putative functional use claims, the data should be
accepted and considered together with the materials
submitted with a patent application. The utility requirement should not be satisfied simply on the basis of a
putative, general biological function derived from a
homology search. An applicant would be rewarded with
exclusive rights to a genetic sequence before a complete
understanding of a biochemical role, and research into
possible therapeutic and diagnostic applications, has
been elucidated. This situation is clearly contrary to the
function of patent law in stimulating innovation. A private research group that receives a patent on a gene
sequence based simply on homology analysis will in

effect be granted a monopoly on future uses and functions that have not been contemplated at the time of
application. In addition to flying in the face of patent
law, such a scheme is contrary to scientific innovation
and the interests of society. It replaces certainty with
conjecture.
The USPTO guidelines state that the nature and
degree of sequence homology data will be considered by
examiners, and in circumstances where a class of genes
share a specific, substantial, and credible utility, assignment of a gene included in a patent application to the
class based on homology will impute the shared specific,
substantial, and credible utility to the assigned gene. This
stipulation is important, as simply imputing a biological
role based on sequence homology will not satisfy the
utility requirement unless the class of genes share a specific, substantial, and credible utility. The UPSTO Utility
Guidelines state that ‘‘reasonable assignment of a new
protein to the class of sufficiently conserved proteins’’
will impute the same specific, substantial, and credible
utility to the novel protein. 92
In circumstances where the protein products of a
family of genes share major structural features but do not
share a specific, substantial, and credible utility, assignment of a gene to the class will not impute a specific,
substantial, and credible utility to the novel gene. The
interpretation of ‘‘ reasonable assignment ’’ is not
expanded upon, and no quantitative basis for satisfying
this requirement is mentioned. Certainly a gene may
share certain conserved domains with a family of conserved genes, but the degree of homology must be substantial in order for a putative function to be assigned
based on the comparison. The opportunity exists for
patent applicants to base an alleged utility solely on
homology with a class of sufficiently conserved proteins
that share a specific, substantial, and credible utility, in
circumstances of low homology that do not in fact support a proper basis for the alleged utility.
As recently suggested by the Government of
Ontario in their report, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office should adopt guidelines similar to those of
the USPTO. 93 Although such guidelines do not have the
force of law, such reform could be readily accomplished
within existing intellectual property laws and would not
require extensive legislative measures.

Legislative Reform
The Supreme Court of Canada recently held in
Harvard College that it is Parliament’s role, and not the
role of the Canadian Patent Office or the courts, to determine the question of whether higher life forms are patentable. 94 The role of the patent office is simply to determine whether patent applications meet the
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility
under the Patent Act. The Supreme Court of Canada
resolved the issue of whether higher life forms are
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included under the definition of ‘‘invention’’ in s. 2 of
the Patent Act. Clearly, the patentability of genetic
sequences is a complex issue and requires carefully
drafted legislative responses. A required element of legislative reform is a redrafted research exemption in the
Canadian Patent Act. Considering the necessity of information and technology sharing for innovation and
development within biomedicine and biotechnology, a
compulsory licensing system including private and
public research firms must be established. Further, a
patent pool for genetic patents must be contemplated,
considering the benefits possible from regulated technology patent pools.
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Amendments to Research Exemptions
Preliminary studies and evidence suggest that considerations of potential patent infringement with the
lack of a clear research exemption have detracted from
basic research. 95 Lack of a clear definition of patent
infringing activity within the research community has
also led to a general lack of disclosure in the scientific
community. The Canadian Patent Act must therefore be
amended to include a specific research exemption that
clearly outlines the boundaries of such an exemption.
The purpose of this exemption will ensure that
researchers have a clear understanding of their rights, but
more importantly, will prevent the forestalling of significant and essential medical research.
In Smith Kline & French Inter-American Corp. v.
Micro Chemicals, 96 the Supreme Court of Canada dealt
with an alleged infringing use of a patent and fashioned
an experimental use exemption. The licensee had
infringed the patent through experimental use prior to
the effective date of a compulsory licence. The Court
held that the use of the patent was not for profit but
rather a bona fide use to ensure the licensee could commercially manufacture the product in accordance with
the specifications of the licensor’s patent. The Court held
this was a logical result of the right to apply for a licence
and could not constitute an infringing use. The scope of
protection afforded under the experimental research
exemption in Smith Kline is unclear, especially since
compulsory licensing provisions have been removed in
Canada.
The Patent Act was amended in 1993 to include
statutory experimental exemptions under s. 55.2. 97 Section 55.2(6) does not clarify the extent of the exemption
in the context of biomedical and biotechnology
research. 98 The exemption in s. 55.2(1) was enacted for
the purpose of the generic pharmaceutical industry, and
states that it is not a patent infringement to make, construct, use or sell a patented invention involving research
required to satisfy federal or provincial regulatory guidelines with respect to a product. The said provision reads
thus:
S. 55.2 (1) It is not an infringement of a patent for any
person to make, construct, use or sell the patented invention
solely for uses reasonably related to the development and

submission of information required under any law of
Canada, a province or a country other than Canada that
regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any
product. 99

Commentators have also called for amendments to
U.S. law with regard to research exemptions. 100 Although
there is a limited statutory experimental research exemption in U.S. law permitting clinical trials under §
271(e)(1), there is no general statutory experimental use
exemption. According to this provision,
§ 271(e)(1) It shall not be an act of infringement to
make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or
import into the United States a patented invention (other
than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as
those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 101

The patent laws of the United Kingdom and Germany contain research exemptions broader than those
under the Canadian Patent Act. The United Kingdom,
Germany, and other European countries conform to the
principles of the Convention for the European Patent for
the Common Market (CPC). 102 Under Article 31 of the
CPC, experimental exemptions are granted for uses of
patented subject matter of a private and non-commercial
nature, and for experimental research relating to the subject matter of the patent. 103 The CPC has not been ratified by countries of the European Community. If ratified
it will provide effective patent protection for an applicant
in all countries of the European Union. 104
The United Kingdom Patents Act provides for
experimental use exemptions under two categories. 105
Under s. 60(5)(a), exemption is provided for acts ‘‘done
privately and for purposes which are not commercial’’. 106
Under s. 60(5)(b), experimental exemption is also provided for acts ‘‘done for experimental purposes relating
to the subject matter of the invention’’. 107 These provisions exempt experimental research designed to improve
or modify the patented subject matter in order to
examine the extent of the patent claims, but prohibit
research examining commercial production of the patented subject matter. 108 German patent use exemptions
protect personal use in the private sphere that is noncommercial. 109 Experimental uses relating to the subject
matter of a patent are exempt, including uses for determining the scope of the patent claims and for determining methods for patenting around the invention.
The Japanese Patents Act provides an exemption for ‘‘the
working of the patented invention for experiment or
study’’. 110
The s. 55.2 amendments to the Canadian Patent Act
have been noted in recent reports by the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee and the Government of
Ontario as being insufficient in affording protection for
researchers from patent infringement suits. 111 The spe-
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cific content of a newly proposed experimental use
exemption in Canadian law would require input from a
number of interested parties, including private firms,
public researchers, and legal professionals. Such an
exemption would attempt to balance the commercial
interests of the private sector while providing the means
for continued innovation through necessary research.
An inherent problem in drafting an experimental
research exemption to satisfy these conflicting interests is
the economic and commercial potential that exists for
current research in biotechnology and biomedicine.
Obviously, private biotechnology firms could not avail
themselves of an exemption to use patented subject
matter for the purpose of commercializing further innovations. The exemption would be primarily designed for
research centers conducting basic research in fundamental molecular biology, including public research centres and universities. However, the close relationships
that have developed between corporate firms and universities create at the very least the potential for commercial products to develop from university research. 112
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In a recent report, the Canadian Biotechnology
Advisory Committee recommends that the Patent Act be
amended with a research and experimental use exemption that includes the following language:
It is not an infringement of a patent to use a patented
process or product either:
privately and for non-commercial processes, or
to study the subject-matter of the patented invention to
investigate its properties, improve upon it, or create a new
product or process. 113

The first clause restates the private and non-commercial exemption from s. 55.2(6) of the Patent Act. The
second clause expands upon the exemption in s. 55.2(6)
‘‘for the purpose of experiments that relate to the subjectmatter of the patent’’. 114 The proposed exemption is
more expansive in the use of the term ‘‘study’’, and on a
literal interpretation offers greater latitude for
researchers, especially private firms, to use patented subject matter in developing further commercial products.
It is clear that drafting an experimental exemption
requires at some point a choice between the competing
values of promoting research while protecting intellectual property rights. In circumstances of public research
conducted by university departmental projects that
receive partial or complete private funding from private
interests, it is difficult to identify research that has noncommercial purposes. In addition, a research department
may receive corporate funding for certain projects, and
maintain separate research-exempt projects designed for
non-commercial purposes. It is not difficult to imagine a
patent holder commencing litigation for patent infringement under such circumstances regardless of the
assumed research exemption, especially if the corporate
firm funding the related research is a competitor. Patent
infringement suits may arise in circumstances where
experimentally exempt university research provides

potential for commercial marketing involving universityindustrial technology transfer. Although university
research departments are generally engaged in basic
research rather than commercially oriented ventures,
there is a growing trend to commercialize basic institutional research through university-industrial transfer programs.
The issue of distinguishing between basic research
and research with commercial interests was explicitly
avoided by the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee in their recent report. 115 Despite the difficulty of
resolving these distinctions in drafting an experimental
use exemption, it is essential that a clearly outlined
amendment be introduced. A possible remedy for these
conflicts is provision for a licensing or royalty scheme
within an experimental research exemption. Such a provision could provide the patent holder with a financial
portion of the economic capital from commercial products produced as a result of patent use under the experimental use exemption. Clearly, the structure of an experimental exemption must be designed to serve the
purpose of promoting further research in biotechnology
and genetics, and must address the problem of access to
platform biotechnology that has arguably inhibited general research progress within the scientific community.

Compulsory Licensing Requirements
Some groups have called for the implementation of
mandatory licensing schemes that would ensure broad
access to novel therapeutics and diagnostic tests. 116
Licensing requirements would also provide research
firms with access to genetic-based technologies and
allow for greater exploitation of genetic resources
through non-exclusive resource development.
Mandatory licensing requirements may be included
within a patent pool regulatory scheme involving public
and private research centers.

Biotechnology Patent Pools
The USPTO has recently examined the application
of patent pools to biotechnology patents, 117 which
involve ‘‘the aggregation of intellectual property rights
which are the subject of cross-licensing, whether they are
transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through
some medium, such as a joint venture, set up specifically
to administer the patent pool’’. 118 Under a biotechnology
patent pool, patent holders would engage in crosslicensing agreements, facilitating the dissemination of
technological innovations within the fields of biotechnology and biomedical research.
The fundamental notion in support of patent pools
is the principle that the benefits of genetic resources will
be exploited to a greater extent by groups of researchers
and organizations rather than through exclusive development. Patent holders will be inclined to form patent
pools that provide capital through licensing fees. The

94
Cohen and Boyer patents, involving recombinant DNA
technology, owned by Stanford University, represent a
licensing scheme that has benefited all licensee organizations, Stanford University, and the entire biotechnology
industry. 119 From 1981 to 1995, Stanford generated $139
million in royalties from licensing agreements.
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The success of this non-exclusive licensing arrangement was based on three essential factors. First, the
licensing fees were inexpensive. Stanford was able to
generate large amounts of capital return because of the
enormous volume of licences granted. This vast market
was available because of the second essential element
that no other alternative technologies were available.
Third, the technology was essential to advancing
research methods in biotechnology and molecular
biology.
As a result, the broad, non-exclusive nature of this
licensing scheme allowed the recombinant DNA
industry, and further biotechnology and biomedical
research, to develop at an exponential rate during the
1980s and 1990s. It is clear that not all licensing schemes
have such potential, as most innovations are not as critical to their respective industry or as widely applicable,
and alternative technologies commonly exist. However,
such a licensing arrangement outlines the potential benefits to patent holders and further industry innovation
from a patent pool, while avoiding restrictions on development and significant transaction costs resulting from
exclusive technology ownership.
A primary concern in a patent pool system is the
potential for anti-competitive behaviour practised by
participating organizations. The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recently set
forth Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (IP Guidelines). 120 These policies are structured to ensure that patent pools provide positive competitive effects and facilitate the advancement of
technological innovation. According to the IP Guidelines, intellectual property pooling will provide a positive
competitive environment through the formation of synergies among related technologies, reduction of transaction costs, effective allocation of technological resources,
and by precluding litigation proceedings. The IP Guidelines also note that anticompetitive behaviour may be
practised through the exclusion of organizations from a
patent pool.
The U.S. Department of Justice has further submitted the following guidelines with regard to the
approval of patent pools: the pool participants are
restricted from aggregating competing technologies for
the purpose of anticompetitive pricing; the pool patents
must be valid; independent determinations are necessary
to identify those patents essential to creating synergies
among complementary technologies; and the patent
pool participants must not attempt to affect market
prices on downstream products. 121
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A patent pool system structured under the above
guidelines, specific to patents on genetic material, would
maximize the social and economic benefits to innovators
and the state, the parties subject to the contract of a
patent. Such a regime could be introduced not only at a
national level, but also possibly as an extension of current international agreements such as the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). 122
The introduction of an intellectual property pool for
genetic patents would alleviate problems caused by the
existence of overlapping patents and stacking licences.
The development of future biotechnological and
biomedical innovations requires the assimilation of data
from a number of genetic sequences. However, there has
been a proliferation of patents granted on genetic
sequences in a number of organisms. As a result, private
firms and research groups are restricted in accessing proprietary genetic subject matter. Moreover, many patents
have been granted on early stage, or upstream, genetic
sequences that require further research before downstream practical innovations are developed.
The rights in such upstream patents could be
licensed to private firms or public and university
research groups, with provision for reach-through license
agreements that provide royalties to the licensor on any
downstream innovations that arise from the initial subject matter. A patent pool regime would provide research
groups with access to platform technologies necessary to
pursue further developments in particular fields. Licensors would be granted license fees or cross-licences, and
the overall development of genetic innovations would be
augmented through the cooperative research of patent
pool members.
Economic benefits would accrue under a patent
pool system as transaction costs could be greatly
reduced. The significant costs of patent infringement litigation are reduced under such a system. In addition,
research firms may obtain an entire portfolio of licences
under a particular technology and avoid the extensive
costs of separate licences. The leverage of certain patent
holders exercising exclusive rights over core technologies
is eliminated, and provisions could be included to
impose reciprocal licensing of any innovations arising
from licensed technologies.
A further benefit proposed may exist in the distribution of risk inherent in the research and development
process in biotechnology. The obvious benefit is for
medium and small biotechnology firms and research
centres that are provided the incentive of offsetting the
associated financial risks. However, such benefits would
only be possible under a patent pool regime that provided a relative equal value for all patents and uniform
access to technologies within the system. It seems
apparent that large pharmaceutical and biotechnology
firms would be reluctant to allow smaller enterprises to
offset their financial risks through partnership. Pharma-
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ceutical and biotechnology firms that hold significant
patent portfolios, and consistently develop products
closer to market realization, can expect to receive greater
benefits from their intellectual property rights than firms
with less resources and lower potential for patent commercialization. A patent pool regime required to induce
the involvement of such firms would require a benefit
sharing system that accounts for initial intellectual property investment.
There are reasons to doubt that the benefits realized
from patent pools will translate directly into the field of
biomedical research. Intellectual property rights form the
basis for the economic value of pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, and private firms may prefer the economic gains available from exclusive patent ownership.
In addition, the lack of alternative technologies in
biomedical research will provide unequal bargaining
power among participants. Firms may be encouraged to
enter a patent pool and introduce invalid patents in an
attempt to prevent litigating the validity of such patents.
Further, firms could receive licensing fees for technology
that is properly part of the public domain. This situation
could readily be prevented through the use of independent expertise to determine only those patents essential
to complement technologies in the pool, as noted in the
U.S. Department of Justice guidelines.
A primary criticism of patent pool regimes is the
potential for monopoly pricing and the encouragement
of anticompetitive price fixing practices. A strict application of guidelines similar in principle to those under the
IP Guidelines and from the U.S. Department of Justice
would prevent anticompetitive behaviour. A parallel
scheme of antitrust legislation would provide for prohibitive measures and penalties. Despite the problems
inherent in structuring a complex patent pool for genetic
patents, and the potential for anticompetitive practices,
further research is necessary to assess patent pools as a
viable solution to the problem of access to platform biotechnologies.

Conclusion

W

e have examined how the patent system evolved
to accommodate the claims of the biotechnology
industry across the globe. 123 In Canada, it is no longer in
doubt that genetic materials are patentable. However,
the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Harvard
College to the effect that higher life forms do not fall
under the definition of ‘‘invention’’ in s. 2 of the Patent
Act still leaves ample room for debate on the broader
legal and social implications of genetic patents. 124 In tune
with emerging global concerns on indiscriminate issuance of patents, the Supreme Court, per Bastarache J.
observed that patents may deter future biomedical

95
research and downstream product development, particularly within the field of biotechnology, and articulated
the importance of maintaining access to platform technology within biomedical research. Similarly, the plurality of the Court noted that the scheme of the current
Patent Act does not contain a sufficiently clear research
exemption. In addition, the court expressed concerns
over the potential high costs of diagnostic tests and therapeutic agents and the implications for Canadian health
care. The plurality of the Court raised these concerns to
illustrate that the current Act is not well designed to
address the unique concerns and issues surrounding the
patenting of higher life forms. 125
These and other issues raised by the Court in
respect of the dramatic expansion of the traditional
patent system 126 underscore the need for a bold
rethinking of the legislative scheme necessary to govern
patents on life forms. In promoting ingenuity, novel
ideas on this issue must balance the interests of the
society with those of the industry. While it is not the
province of the courts or the patent office to rewrite or
amend the norms of science, 127 it is certainly their
bounden duty to enforce extant laws with vigilance and
even-handedness bearing in mind the essence of the
patent regime. Of particular importance in this context is
the objective of promoting the notion of universal health
care in Canada. In this biomedical age, the Canadian
philosophy of universal health care is severely threatened
by the indiscriminate granting of overly broad and speculative genetic patents.
These unique concerns raised by the majority of the
Supreme Court in Harvard College regarding the issue
of patenting higher life forms likewise support the position that the current Patent Act is not well designed to
accommodate genetic patents. The reasoning of the
majority in Harvard College also supports the submission that novel legislative schemes are required to properly govern the patenting of genetic sequences. Further,
such specific legislative responses must balance protection of exclusive intellectual property rights under the
current regime against promoting the fundamental
notion of universal health care in Canada.
The field of biotechnology and biomedicine is at an
early stage and its immense promise should not be
aborted by a lax interpretation and application of contemporary patent laws. The basic framework for understanding biochemical processes and human disease, the
human genome, has just recently been disclosed. The
future of research will involve characterizing thousands
of genes and protein products and myriad synergistic
biochemical processes. In order for this endeavour to
effectively advance, which requires providing incentive
for scientific innovation and benefits to medicine and
biotechnology, access to research tools is essential.
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